The rally in Kaliningrad:
During an unauthorized protest in Kaliningrad, 36 people were detained, OVD-Info reports. Fifteen were taken to Police Department No. 2, and another twelve were transported by police van to the Leningradsky branch of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

In Moscow, city authorities had approved an anti-corruption rally to be held on Sakharov Avenue. However, Navalny cancelled the event one day prior, stating that city officials were “forbidding all contractors from providing a stage and sound equipment for supporters at the rally site.” He instead called for a “peaceful” demonstration to be held on Tverskaya Street.

The Moscow prosecutor’s office labeled these statements “provocations,” asserting that the Anti-Corruption Foundation’s (FBK) planned rally on Tverskaya was “unlawful.”

 

Even before the rally began, police attempted to interfere with its organization.
Overnight, police raided Navalny’s Moscow campaign office, beating staff member Alexander Turovsky, inflicting a traumatic brain injury. The office was ransacked; all equipment and documents were confiscated. Afterward, the injured Turovsky was taken to a police station and held in a cell. He was later tried and fined for disobeying police orders.

A search was conducted at Navalny’s campaign office in Kaliningrad.
“The head of Navalny’s campaign office in Kaliningrad: a search has begun.”
According to Yegor Chernyuk, the regional office of Alexei Navalny, which had just opened the day before (Thursday), was raided by police.
“The search is following the standard procedure. We are suspected of storing extremist materials. The search is being conducted by police officers,” Chernyuk told a correspondent from Novy Kaliningrad.Ru.
According to the press service of the Kaliningrad Regional Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, they had no information about local police participating in the search of Navalny’s office. (July 7, 2017)

 

In Kaliningrad, the organizer of Navalny’s rally was expelled from Kant Baltic Federal University for “unlawful behavior.”
Oleg Alekseev, the organizer of the anti-corruption rally held on June 12, was expelled from Kant Baltic Federal University (BFU named after Kant) for “unlawful behavior.” Alekseev himself reported this to RBC.

RBC, which obtained a copy of the expulsion order, stated that “unlawful behavior” was defined as public disrespect for the law and the courts, violation of internal university regulations, and an unresolved disciplinary penalty.
“I consider the decision unlawful. The wording — ‘disrespect for the law and the courts’ — is simply absurd,” Alekseev told RBC. “The order does not specify what this disrespect consisted of. I will definitely appeal the decision.”
He stated that during a private conversation at the university, officials expressed dissatisfaction with his VKontakte post about difficulties in obtaining permission for the June 12 anti-corruption rally in Kaliningrad.
Alekseev also mentioned that a previously unnamed representative of the security forces and another university employee from the security department were present during the conversation. He was advised to move the rally from the city center to a park on the outskirts and was warned that “consequences would follow” regarding his studies.

 

In Novorossiysk, activist Nikolai Yezhov was beaten unconscious by unknown assailants inside the city administration building, where he had come to submit an application to hold a rally against corruption scheduled for June 12, 2017.
The police claimed that “no beating occurred.”

 

In recent months, at least ten attacks have been carried out on campaign offices in various cities.
These attacks — often committed by so-called “activists” — are rarely stopped by police, and no criminal or administrative investigations are initiated.
In some cases, police block access to campaign offices under pretexts such as a supposed bomb threat.
There are no legal grounds for banning “election campaign offices.”
Bomb threat reports, which are knowingly false denunciations, are also not investigated — the only criminal case was initiated after Navalny’s meeting with supporters on March 17 in Tomsk.
Novaya Gazeta compiled a list of the most high-profile attacks on campaign offices and their coordinators.

In addition to banning rallies organized by Navalny’s opposition, the authorities also prohibit other opposition groups from holding protests throughout Russia.
This applies to all regions of the country. For example, the Yabloko party was prohibited from holding anti-war pickets in Tambov and Saratov:

“The administration of Tambov refused to authorize pickets by the Yabloko party as part of Grigory Yavlinsky’s anti-war campaign against Russia’s involvement in military conflicts, particularly in Syria,”
the party’s official statement reads.

At the end of June, activists requested permission from the city administration to set up campaign cubes at two locations in Tambov, but were denied.

“Such events violate the principle of equality among citizens intending to participate in the presidential election as candidates. By analogy with the law, one may conclude that it is impermissible to distribute campaign-related information outside the official campaign period,”
stated a letter signed by Deputy Head of the City Administration Antonina Kolodina.

It is worth noting that since June 16, Yabloko activists had begun collecting signatures against the deployment of Russian troops in military operations in Syria. Signatures were being collected in 40 regions across the country. The series of pickets was intended to be part of the presidential campaign of Grigory Yavlinsky for the 2018 Russian election.

 

The confrontation with “Putin’s repressive regime” did not stop there.
Putin moved to filter the membership of electoral oversight bodies in order to avoid unwelcome surprises during the election.
Out of 260 submitted applications for membership in Public Monitoring Commissions (ONKs), only 130 candidates were included on the final voting lists.

The Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation published the updated ONK membership lists late on Friday evening.
But the resulting scandal could not be silenced. Due to an unlawful and unexplained effort to exclude human rights defenders, half of the candidate names were removed from the ballots.
As a result, the additional recruitment failed entirely in several regions, and in both Moscow and the Moscow region, less than half of the quota was filled.

 

The actions and measures taken by the authorities against dissenters now resemble the communist regime of the USSR.
From outright bans on protests, the authorities have moved on to imprisoning people.
Dissenters are fired from their jobs, students are expelled from universities, colleges, and schools, and then inevitably end up in prison.
The next step will be executions — just like during Stalin’s repressions.

Already, public discussion is emerging in Russia around the possible return of the death penalty.
And that time still lies ahead. What is happening now is merely a preparatory stage for mass repressions.

In Russia, it has now become standard practice to designate non-profit organizations as “foreign agents” in order to silence their efforts to defend citizens’ rights guaranteed by the Russian Constitution.

“The ‘foreign agent’ law was designed to shackle, stigmatize, and ultimately silence critical NGOs. A wide range of organizations have come under its scope. Its application has inflicted significant damage on the quality of public discourse in Russia and has resulted in violations of individual rights. In the end, it is not so much the NGOs that suffer, but Russian society as a whole,”
stated Sergei Nikitin, Head of Amnesty International’s Russia Office.
(Source: Amnesty International, November 18, 2016)

 

Over the years, the authorities have achieved “tremendous success”: in some regions, there are virtually no human rights organizations left.

“First to suffer were human rights groups, followed by environmental organizations, and then scientific and sociological centers,”
said Maria Kanevskaya, Head of the NGO Lawyers’ Club.

 

The crackdown on dissent has also expanded into the online space.
Authorities monitor private communications on social media, review bloggers’ comments, and block websites.
For example, Roskomnadzor (Russia's media regulator) recently blocked the investigative website Russiangate after it published an investigation into the head of the Federal Security Service (FSB):

“Roskomnadzor restricted access to the Russiangate website from within Russia at the request of the Prosecutor General’s Office.
According to Russiangate, a man with the same full name as FSB Director Alexander Bortnikov owns a plot of land and a house in an elite village in one of the most expensive districts of St. Petersburg.
This property is not listed in the official asset declarations of the FSB Director.”

On Wednesday, Russiangate’s Editor-in-Chief Alexandra Yelagina told Echo of Moscow radio:

“I’ve been dismissed as editor-in-chief. Our publication is shutting down. A criminal case for extremism may also have been opened.”

Russiangate has already been added to Roskomnadzor’s blacklist.
According to the agency’s official website, the site was blocked for violating Article 15.3 of the Federal Law “On Information, Information Technologies and the Protection of Information.”
This article allows Roskomnadzor to restrict access to websites that post materials calling for mass unrest, extremist activity, or participation in public events held in violation of the established legal order.

Ironically, the decision to block Russiangate was recorded in Roskomnadzor’s registry with a date from 2015 — a time when the Russiangate project didn’t even exist.
(Source: BBC Russian Service, February 19, 2018)

Total control has extended to television and all mass media.
Only a few newspapers, news channels, and websites remain from which one can still obtain truthful information about protest activities and political movements in the country. However, it appears that these remaining sources will soon face strict censorship as well.

In addition to political protests, socio-economic demonstrations are actively taking place across Russia.
All socio-economic protests eventually escalate into political ones. This is an undeniable fact, since the extraction of financial and material resources from the country and the improvement of the nation’s socio-economic well-being are fundamentally incompatible goals. And it is the first goal — resource extraction — that holds unquestionable priority for the Russian authorities.

One example is the well-known protests by truck drivers against the “Platon” system.
Platon is a Russian toll collection system that charges heavy trucks for damage caused to federal highways.
Under the guise of maintaining and improving the national road network, the system masks the personal enrichment of Putin and his associates, the Rotenberg family.
Funds collected by the Platon system are funneled through RT-Invest Transport Systems LLC directly into their pockets.

The legal ownership structure of the Platon system is as follows (source: Wikipedia):

“The operator of the system is RT-Invest Transport Systems (RTITS), 50% of which is owned by Igor Rotenberg, and the remaining 50% by RT-Invest LLC, in which the state-owned corporation Rostec holds a 25% share.”
(According to Russia’s Unified State Register of Legal Entities (EGRUL), the founders of RT-Invest Transport Systems LLC are Igor Arkadyevich Rotenberg (50% of the authorized capital) and RT-Invest LLC (50%). The total authorized capital of the organization is 650,100,000 rubles.)

For its services, the operator receives over 10.6 billion rubles per year from the federal budget.
According to official forecasts, the federal government expects revenues of 20–40 billion rubles annually from the implementation of the system.

 

To suppress the truckers’ strike, on December 1, 2017, the Russian Ministry of Justice added the Association of Cargo Carriers (OPR) to the list of “foreign agents.”
The justification for the designation was a series of financial transfers to the organization's account from unidentified individuals in Germany.

Earlier, the Prosecutor’s Office appealed the decision of the Presidium of the Astrakhan Regional Court to overturn the conviction of Igor Stenin for incitement to extremism.
The case was returned to the Astrakhan Regional Court, and a travel restriction was imposed on the activist.

In May 2016, Stenin was sentenced to two years in a penal settlement for inciting extremism online (Part 2 of Article 280 of the Russian Criminal Code). According to investigators, he reposted an article from the official list of extremist materials on VKontakte and added a comment calling for the destruction of “Kremlin occupiers” and demanding that they “take their hands off Ukraine.”
The human rights organization Memorial recognized Stenin as a political prisoner.

 

The persecution of citizens and journalists by Russian authorities for their political beliefs and attempts to defend civil rights has become widespread.
News outlets are filled with reports of detentions and arrests of protest participants, as well as the harassment of journalists conducting investigations into corruption and violations of civil rights. These actions are often accompanied by abuse of authority and violations of Russian law by state officials.

The infringement of political and civil rights in Russia is also carried out through refusals to initiate criminal proceedings in cases involving violence against individuals.
One example: the Investigative Committee refused to open a case against a police officer who assaulted a journalist.

In Petrozavodsk, the Investigative Committee (IC) refused to initiate a criminal case concerning an incident in which a police officer assaulted journalist Alexey Vladimirov, owner of the online journal Chernika, during an anti-corruption rally on March 26.
Vladimirov himself reported the incident to Novaya Gazeta. According to him, the Union of Journalists of Karelia requested that a criminal case be initiated under the article concerning obstruction of lawful journalistic activity.
The union submitted a formal appeal to the IC after the incident. On July 12, the committee issued an official response stating that a preliminary inquiry had been conducted, after which it was decided not to open a criminal case.
The document was signed by Major of Justice Artem Parfenchikov.

According to Vladimirov, during the protest the police officer first punched him in the face and broke his glasses, and when Vladimirov attempted to identify the officer (who was not wearing a badge), he was kicked in the leg. His phone was confiscated and later returned.
Vladimirov noted that he introduced himself as a journalist and displayed his press badge. He also stated that the officer used profanity, which is confirmed in the video recording he made.

“I was the only journalist wearing a press badge — I always wear it when I attend public events,”Vladimirov added.

 

2. Politics and Methods of Inciting Internal Division.

Internal aggression in Russia is manifested both by the authorities toward the population and among the population itself.
In essence, a street-level civil conflict has begun between citizens, while the government has withdrawn from addressing the problem — because such an atmosphere benefits those in power. It can be said that Russian authorities even encourage and organize confrontation among various segments of society, differentiated by political views, economic status, education level, religion, and other social characteristics.

By fomenting conflict between citizens, the authorities create a pretext for increasing the use of force against those who disagree with state policies. At the same time, officials justify their actions with so-called “good intentions,” claiming to maintain peace and order within the country. They use slogans like “We won’t rock the boat,” or “No Maidan in Russia,” and similar rhetoric.

Numerous facts point to the growing conflict among citizens. Here are just a few examples:

“The state refuses to protect individuals whose views differ from the majority.
The hunting season against opposition activists, human rights defenders, and independent journalists continues.”

• The family of Yulia Latynina was forced to flee the country due to serious threats to their personal safety.

• Local residents had to defend a memorial plaque on Boris Nemtsov’s home from attacks by members of the pro-Kremlin group SERB.

• Criminal cases in such incidents are either not initiated at all or are never properly investigated.

• The impunity of such attackers only provokes further violence.

• The state has withdrawn, and in its absence, a street war has begun.

 

One specific case:
Nikolai Lyaskin, head of Alexei Navalny’s Moscow campaign office, was attacked as he exited the office on Gilyarovskogo Street near Prospekt Mira metro station.
He was struck multiple times with a metal pipe — on the head and shoulder.

Lyaskin was hospitalized at the N.V. Sklifosovsky Institute for Emergency Care, where he was diagnosed with a closed traumatic brain injury.

 

As a result of a preliminary inquiry, a criminal case was opened under Article 213, Part 1 of the Russian Criminal Code (“Hooliganism”).
However, the Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK) is demanding that the case be reclassified under Article 277 (“Assault on the life of a state or public figure”), which reflects the true severity and politically motivated nature of the attack.

“Article 213 of the Russian Criminal Code (‘Hooliganism’) does not account for serious bodily harm.
In this case, it is obvious that being struck in the head with a heavy metal pipe is not just a threat to one’s health — it is a threat to life. This clearly falls under Article 277 of the Criminal Code.
The situation could have ended much more tragically than it did.”

 

The incitement of public hostility is fueled through television and other mass media.
Aggression infiltrates the viewer’s consciousness via television using a variety of techniques.

The authorities claim that attacks on activists and journalists have nothing to do with Russian television.
However, experts argue that television itself cultivates aggression — and they describe how this is done.

One of the topics revived in public discourse after the attack on “Echo of Moscow” journalist Tatyana Felgengauer was the influence of modern Russian-language television on viewers.
Can watching programs that label Echo of Moscow as “enemies” and “traitors” trigger violent action by mentally unstable individuals?
The authorities have a predictable answer: “No.”
Presidential Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov stated:

“Such tragic incidents cause the deepest regret. But the actions of a madman are simply that — the actions of a madman. To try to link them to anything or paint them with any color is completely illogical and wrong,”
Peskov said when asked whether television content might affect the mental state of individuals like Boris Grits (Felgengauer's attacker).

That week, even Patriarch Kirill indirectly disagreed with the Kremlin's main mouthpiece.
He stated that he feels “fear” while watching Russian TV channels — though his concern lies elsewhere: he claims that despite the “trash” shown on TV, the number of believers is growing.

Over time, experts — including psychiatrists, TV critics, and linguists — have challenged Peskov’s and the Kremlin’s view.
With their help, Novaya Gazeta attempted to outline a methodology for how aggression is created in the television broadcast and how it enters the viewer’s psyche.

 

These techniques can be summarized as follows:

1. The “Us vs. Them” Method:
“The ‘Us’ group” is portrayed as polite, rational, and moral, while “The ‘Them’ group” is shown as aggressive, irrational, and in the minority.

2. The Enemy Construction Method:
This includes mocking opposing viewpoints, increasing intolerance toward dissenters, and using aggression — both verbal and nonverbal — against the “Them” group, even to the point of physical violence.
Such depictions create a behavioral model for how viewers may act in similar real-life situations.

3. The Method of Inducing Fear and Anxiety – to which 86% of people are susceptible.
This method primarily affects emotionally sensitive individuals who lack the capacity for critical analysis of what is happening.

4. The Method of Domination.
Programs employing aggressive rhetoric and psychological manipulation are broadcast during evening hours, when most viewers are home and in front of their televisions.

 

These tools of inciting hatred and violence are used not only to divide Russian citizens among themselves but also to foster hostility toward foreigners.
For example, on the program “Time Will Tell” aired by Channel One on October 12, 2017, host Artyom Sheynin acted with extreme aggression toward American political commentator Michael Bohm.
In response to Bohm’s comments, Sheynin grabbed him by the back of the head and forcefully bent him forward, shouting:

“Why are you provoking me, my friend? I told you to sit down!”

In another case, during the November 2016 broadcast of “Right to Vote” on TV Center (TVC), Polish journalist Tomasz Maciejczuk was physically assaulted.
The show’s host and several panelists attacked him after he remarked:

“Ukrainians just want to live like normal people, not in s**t like you do.”

Similarly, Ukrainian political analyst Vyacheslav Kovtun was beaten in the makeup room during a break in the “Time Will Tell” broadcast on October 31, which focused on the issue of peace in Donbas.

​